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Why Europe will suffer more 
Daniel Gros 
 
uropeans have a tendency to call the financial 
crisis a US problem, or a crisis precipitated by 
the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model. The data suggest 
otherwise. Moreover, the corporate sector in Europe 
has a much lower capacity to finance investment from 
internal sources of funds, which implies that a 
recovery of investment in Europe will be much more 
difficult than in the US, as long as the banking sector 
remains weakened by excessive levels of leverage. 
The cost of the crisis could thus be much larger in 
Europe than in the US. 
The literature on financial crises has demonstrated 
that almost all major crises have been preceded by a 
combination of two phenomena: an increase in 
leverage (or credit expansion) and an unusual increase 
in asset prices.
1 These two alarm signals could be 
observed not only in the US but in Europe as well. 
Yet, unfortunately, they were largely ignored on both 
sides of the Atlantic.
2 And, contrary to a widespread 
perception, Europe accumulated more imbalances 
than the US. Moreover, the higher reliance of the 
European corporate sector on external financing 
suggests that it will take longer for Europe to recover. 
It is instructive to look more closely at both indicators 
of looming financial instability separately: a) credit 
expansion (or leverage) and b) the asset price bubble. 
Credit expansion 
Generally low standards of risk aversion invite 
financial institutions to increase credit, which 
happened on a large scale on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Excessive levels of leverage are an essential 
                                                      
1 See for example Adalid & Detken (2007) or Alessi & 
Detken (2009).  
2 See de Grauwe & Gros (2009) and Carmassi et al. 
(forthcoming) on the reasons for this. 
ingredient of most crises and the present one 
constitutes no exception. Leverage is defined in 
financial markets as the ratio of debt to equity 
financing. A higher level of leverage indicates in 
general a lower capacity to absorb losses and hence 
greater fragility. In macroeconomic terms, leverage is 
better defined as the ratio of credit to GDP. 
Leverage defined this way increases when credit 
expands, but prices for goods and services remain 
stable so that nominal GDP does not increase.
3 A high 
level of leverage is an essential ingredient in any 
major financial crisis because it means that many 
agents have issued promises to pay a certain nominal 
amount but do not necessarily have the ‘expected’ 
regular cash flow to honour these promises (see 
Minsky, 2008, for the classical description of leverage 
schemes leading systems towards instability). Since 
regular cash flows will be proportional to GDP, 
macroeconomic leverage can be measured by relating 
the stock of credit to GDP. It is not possible to 
establish an absolute benchmark for leverage, as 
different financial systems can support quite different 
ratios of credit to GDP. However, changes over time, 
especially rapid increases in this ratio, constitute 
alarm signals which have been identified as reliable 
predictors of financial crisis. 
This warning signal was certainly flashing in Europe 
before 2007-08.
4 The increase in overall leverage, 
                                                      
3 According to Borio & Lowe (2002), a low inflation 
environment increases the likelihood that excess demand 
pressures show up in the form of credit growth and asset 
price bubbles rather than in goods price inflation. If this is 
the case, inflation-targeting central banks with a ‘myopic 
behaviour’ could contribute to financial instability (see de 
Grauwe, 2009, and de Grauwe & Gros, 2009). 
4 We leave aside the question why the build-up of the credit 
boom was ignored. Inflation-targeting by central banks was 
E 
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measured by the debt-to-GDP ratio, was broadly 
similar to the one experienced in the US; only its 
distribution over different sectors was different. The 
set of tables below (1a and 1b) shows these stylised 
facts.  
A first key observation is that the increase in overall 
(economy-wide) leverage has always been higher in 
the euro area (EA) than in the US. The increase 
between 1999 and (end) 2007 was around 100% of 
GDP for the EA, while in the US it amounted ‘only’ 
to 80% of GDP. Similarly leverage in the non-
financial corporate sector increased by more (25% of 
GDP, 1999 to end 2007) in the EA, than in the US 
(where the increase was only 3%). 
Table 1. Debt-to-GDP ratios 
  a) Economy-wide  b) Non-financial 
corporate sector 
  EA US EA US 
1999 3.51  2.66  0.67 0.46 
2007 4.54  3.47  0.92 0.49 
2008 4.73  3.46  0.97 0.49 
Change 
1999-2007  1.03 0.81 0.25 0.03 
Notes: Economy-wide includes households, non-financial 
companies, the financial sector and government. Debt is the 
sum of securities and loans by the non-financial sector and 
banks or non-monetary financial institutions (MFIs).  
Sources: ECB statistical data Warehouse, Euro Area 
Accounts, balance sheet & Federal Reserve Z1, March 
2009. 
Yet, the most relevant differences between the US and 
the euro area come in the leverage of households and 
the financial sector. As one would expect, leverage 
increased considerably in the US household sector 
(40% of GDP) but increased very little in the euro 
area.  
A surprising further, important difference between the 
EA and the US is that financial sector leverage is at a 
much higher level in the euro area and increased by 
much more (about 70% of GDP compared to 40% in 
the US). This is the key underlying cause of the 
widespread stress in the European banking system. 
The crisis might have originated in the US, but the 
                                                                                         
probably one key reason. According to Borio & Lowe 
(2002), a low-inflation environment increases the likelihood 
that excess demand pressures show up in the form of credit 
growth and asset prices bubble rather than in goods price 
inflation. If this is the case, inflation-targeting central banks 
with a ‘myopic behaviour’ could contribute to financial 
instability (see de Grauwe, 2009, and de Grauwe & Gros, 
2009).  
European financial sector was very fragile and 
exposed to losses from US (and other) assets. 
Table 2. Debt-to-GDP ratios 
   c) Financial sector   d) Households 
& small business 
  EA US  EA  US 
1999 1.61  0.79  0.48  0.88 
2007 2.32  1.17  0.61  1.28 
2008 2.42  1.17  0.61  1.24 
Change 
1999-2007  0.71   0.38  0.13 0.4 
Note: The financial sector in the EA is defined as MFIs, 
insurance corporations and pension funds and other 
financial intermediaries including financial auxiliaries. 
MFIs’ debt is given by debt securities issued plus currency 
and deposits. 
Sources: ECB Statistical data Warehouse, balance sheet & 
Federal Reserve Z1. March 2009. 
Asset price bubble 
Another reason why Europe was as exposed as the US 
to this crisis is that Europe experienced the same real 
estate price bubble as the US. Figure 1 shows this 
using the ratio of house prices to rents which (like the 
price/earnings ratio for stocks) should be stable over 
longer periods.
5 It is apparent that since the mid-1990s 
house prices have increased by almost exactly the 
same relative amount, reaching an unprecedented 
level on both sides of the Atlantic. The main 
difference between the US and the euro area is only 
that since 2006-07 house prices have declined more in 
the US. 
This suggests that on average the euro area suffers 
from the same crisis symptoms as the US in terms of 
leverage and a house price bubble. It was only the 
trigger event of the crisis that took place in the US. 
The comparison undertaken here is mainly between 
the US and the euro area because of data availability 
and because both are of a similar size. The data for the 
UK show similar symptoms: leverage increased as 
well and house prices increased by as much as in the 
euro area. 
 
                                                      
5 When looking at house prices in nominal terms, the Case-
Shiller index is the one most used. However, this exhibits 
quite high volatility if compared to the OECD index. In 
1999 the two indices were at the same level (about 92), but 
by 2006 the Case-Shiller index increased by about 250%, 
while the OECD one, at its peak in 2007, had not even 
doubled. At the end of 2008, the two indices were again 
back to a similar level (just above 150).  Why Europe will suffer more| 3 
Figure 1. House prices: Price-rent ratios 
0.80
0.90
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1970:2
1971:2
1972:2
1973:2
1974:2
1975:2
1976:2
1977:2
1978:2
1979:2
1980:2
1981:2
1982:2
1983:2
1984:2
1985:2
1986:2
1987:2
1988:2
1989:2
1990:2
1991:2
1992:2
1993:2
1994:2
1995:2
1996:2
1997:2
1998:2
1999:2
2000:2
2001:2
2002:2
2003:2
2004:2
2005:2
2006:2
2007:2
2008:2
Euro Area USA
 
Note: Euro area index is defined as the weighted average (by GDP) of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, 
Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands.  
Source: OECD, May 2009, and own computations. 
 
Data are scarce on house prices for the new member 
states and their case it is much more difficult to 
establish a longer-term historical norm against which 
to judge the housing sector. In some of the smaller 
new member states (especially in the Baltics and the 
Balkans), however, it is clear that large house price 
and construction bubbles emerged and have now burst 
leading to very sharp contractions in economic 
activity.  
All in all it would thus appear that the average for the 
full EU-27 would not be much different in terms of 
house prices and leverage increases from the euro area 
average. However, the euro area averages hide 
important differences across countries, both in terms 
of leverage and house prices.  
Figures 2 and 3 show the relevant variables. Figure 2 
shows that within the euro area there are enormous 
differences in terms of the evolution of house prices 
(relative to rents), which have been stable in Germany 
but increased by over 80% (and thus more than in the 
US) in France and Spain.  
A similar picture emerges when one looks at leverage 
yields. The evolution of credit growth shows similar 
differences: leverage (as measured by MFI assets 
relative to GDP) was high, but stable in Germany, 
whereas it increased considerably in those countries 
where house prices increased (most in France and 
Spain).
6  
                                                      
6 At first sight, it might thus be surprising that the German 
banking system was also hard hit by the crisis. But the 
German banking system was affected also because it 
This analysis focuses on the eurozone average. The 
large differences within the eurozone are probably due 
to a combination of a fundamental asymmetry in the 
initial conditions between Germany and the rest of the 
members and differences in the structure of national 
financial markets. The fundamental asymmetry in 
initial conditions was created by the construction 
boom in Germany following unification. This boom 
peaked in 1995, when construction constituted about 
14% of that country’s GDP. At this point wages also 
started to increase, which in turn led the Bundesbank 
to hike interest rates considerably, thus precipitating 
currency crisis throughout Europe and triggering a 
sharp recession. From 1995 the German economy 
remained weak as its construction sector contracted 
slowly but continuously until about 2005 (when it had 
shrunk to about 8% of GDP). By contrast, other 
countries in the eurozone experienced a real estate 
boom over this period with rising house prices and 
increasing construction activity supported by the 
lower interest rates brought about by the euro. 
Different characteristics in national financial markets 
(e.g. the availability of mortgages indexed on short-
term rates, different loan-to-value ratios, etc.) meant 
that this easing of financial conditions had quite 
differentiated impacts on different member countries.
7 
                                                                                         
intermediated the large current account surplus of the 
country by investing in what appeared then as a most 
promising instrument, namely US securitised household 
debt. German banks, and thus also indirectly German 
savers, had to take large losses when the US bubble burst. 
7 See Gros (forthcoming) and Calza et al. (2009). 4 | Daniel Gros 
  
Figure 2. House prices: Price-rent ratios 
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Source: OECD, May 2009. 
Figure 3. Total MFIs’ liabilities other than capital and reserves (relative to GDP) 
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Sources: ECB Statistical data Warehouse, MFIs’ accounts. 
The importance of the financial sector to 
investment 
A financial system that needs to reduce leverage has a 
tendency to restrict the availability of credit. How 
important is this to the economy? This depends of 
course on the financing needs of the various sectors in 
the economy. European consumers traditionally have 
been large savers (with the exception of Spain). They 
do not need credit to maintain consumption. 
However, the corporate sector is in a completely 
different situation. It typically needs access to external 
financing to maintain investment. But in this area 
again it appears that the situation in the US is better.  
Figure 4 below shows that during most of the past 
decade, the US corporate sector had a much smaller 
financing gap than did the European sector. During 
the first quarter of 2009, the US corporate sector 
actually became a net saver because its profits (or 
rather the net cash flows from current operations) 
were larger than expenditure for investment. This Why Europe will suffer more| 5 
implies that from now on, the US corporate sector 
does not need to receive new credit (from banks or 
other sources) in order to maintain investment at least 
at the present level. There are of course large 
differences within the US corporate sector, with some 
parts registering a large cash flow surplus (e.g. the 
tech sector) and other parts (e.g. the automobile 
sector), a large deficit. But the commercial paper 
market, which continues to function, can recycle the 
surplus funds for enterprises such as Microsoft to 
those firms in need of funds.  
The situation in the European corporate sector is quite 
different. It can finance only about one-third of all 
investment from internal sources and thus has still has 
a considerable financing gap of around 6% of its value 
added. This implies that the corporate sector in the 
euro area needs a continuing flow of new credit just in 
order to keep investment going at the present level. 
Europe thus faces the unpleasant reality of having a 
financial sector with a stronger need for deleveraging 
in combination with a corporate sector that is more 
dependent on external finance than the US. 
Figure 4. Financing need of the corporate sector 
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Conclusions 
This crisis has often been labelled a ‘US crisis’ and 
European policy-makers still have a tendency to argue 
that this crisis started in the US and that Europe was 
an innocent bystander which was hit only because 
financial markets are integrated. This attitude is of 
course politically convenient because it implies that 
European policy-makers have no responsibility for 
this crisis. However, the numbers tell a different story: 
an unprecedented level of credit was allowed to 
develop in Europe. 
This crisis might have started in the US, but even 
more combustible material had accumulated in 
Europe, so that it likely that the cost will be higher 
here and the recovery slower than on the other side of 
the Atlantic. 
Costello et al. (2009) suggest that this crisis might 
lead to a considerable fall in potential output for the 
eurozone. This seems indeed highly likely considering 
the European combination of a highly leveraged 
financial sector and a corporate sector dependent on 
external financing. 
 
What does this analysis imply for macroeconomic 
policy? At first sight, one might be tempted to argue 
that the need for expansionary policies is even 
stronger in Europe than in the US. But this is not as 
straightforward as one might think.  
An expansionary fiscal policy is useful, especially in 
the US because it can ‘substitute’ for falling demand 
for household construction and sustain consumption 
(via transfers to households). In Europe deficit 
spending also might sustain demand, but this cannot 
really substitute for the missing investment that 
translates into a lower future capital stock and lower 
productivity growth. In Europe particular care should 
thus be taken not to crowd out private investment, 
which is already weakened by difficult access to 
credit. 
On monetary policy, the need for an expansionary 
policy is also evident, but one again has to think about 
what the ultimate aim is. In the US the ultimate aim of 
policy is to lower interest rates. The central bank can 
directly control only short-term interest rates, which it 6 | Daniel Gros 
has driven to very close to zero. But longer-term 
interest rates are determined in the market for longer 
term securities. Hence the Federal Reserve has 
embarked on a programme to buy T bills, a policy that 
is also called quantitative easing (QE). The analysis 
presented here suggests that in the EU the key 
problem might be the availability of credit, not the 
level of longer-term interest rates. It thus makes sense 
that the ECB has so far refused to push its policy 
interest rate to zero. But the ECB has also 
implemented its own version of quantitative easing by 
lending banks an unprecedented amount (over €400 
billion, much more than the Fed has done in terms of 
QE) at its policy rate (1%) for a maturity of one year. 
Our analysis suggests that this is the right approach 
and that probably further QE of this type is needed in 
Europe until lending conditions return to normal. 
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Annex: The credit boom over time 
Not only has the leverage of the financial sector (and of the economy as whole) increased by more in the euro area 
than in the US, over time it also exhibits higher volatility. Figures A1 and A2 show the first difference of the 
leverage indicators for the various sectors already used for Tables 1 and 2 above. Figure A1 shows that in the US 
leverage started to increase considerably already in 2001, with the pace actually somewhat declining over time 
(except for the spike in 2007). By contrast Figure A2 shows that in the euro area leverage really took off only after 
2004, but then at increased rates (at around 20% per annum), which are usually associated with credit booms in 
emerging markets. 
Figure A1. The growth of US leverage indicators over the last decade 
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Figure A2. The growth of leverage indicators in the euro area over the last decade 
EA Debt-to-GDP: first difference
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